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emitted from coal burning in China measurably affects Japan (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 4 February 1993, p. 16). Water pollution in the Danube harms 
up to seven countries before the river empties into the Black Sea (Amicus 
Journal, Fall 1994, p. 41). Furthermore, in recent years, previously unrecog- 
nized global phenomena such as the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer 
and the accumulation of greenhouse gases have emerged. In other cases, our 
scientific understanding of the scope of a harm has expanded. Mercury, for 
instance, is now known to travel thousands of miles through the air. As the 
world economy grows, transboundary pollution spillovers are likely to increase 
- rendering country-by-country policy responses ever more inadequate. 
National environmental institutions are poorly suited to cope with trans- 
boundary pollution problems because of a 'structural mismatch' between their 
scope of authority or jurisdiction and the scale of the harm (Esty, 1996). Specif- 
icaly, government officials, trying to please their own constituents, give little 
weight to the harms (or benefits) affecting outsiders or foreigners, thereby 
skewing the regulatory cost-benefit calculus. Where a river flows beyond a 
country's borders, it is highly likely that the amount of pollution control will 
be suboptimal (Baumol and Oates, 1975. Recognition that state-by-state envi- 
ronmental efforts were largely ineffective because of similar transboundary 
spillovers led to a dramatic restructing and federalization of environmental 
policymaking in the United States in the 1970s (Stewart, 1977; Esty, 1996; 
Revesz, 1997).1 
When a problem is global in scope and the burdens of pollution control fall 
entirely within the country and the benefits accrue largely outside, there is an 
overwhelming tendency not to act. Thus, no country finds it in its own interest 
to control greenhouse gas emissions unilaterally. Each country's share of the 
global damages derived from its own emissions is relatively small, making 'free 
riding' a rational policy.2 Given the difficulties of coordinating a unified policy 
among sovereign nations, the lack of an international environmental protection 
entity to enforce agreements, and the uncertainties associated with many global 
environmental problems, countries often simply ignore transboundary harms. 
While this practice of disregarding pollution spillovers may once have been 
acceptable because the harms were small and roughly reciprocal, international 
environmental problems are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore (Esty, 
1994: p. 17). 
When pollution is regional in scope, and only a few countries are affected, 
coordinated national action may be workable. In a number of cases, neighboring 
countries have negotiated reasonably effective bilateral pollution control agree- 
ments. Japan, for example, is financing sulfur dioxide controls in China; the 
United States has reduced acid rain drifting into Canada; and Sweden has paid 
Poland to cut coal-burning emissions. These programs suggest that as long as 
the number of parties is small, national regulatory authorities may be able to 
work collaboratively to control pollution. This observation matches economic 
theory which suggests that where transaction costs are low, efficient negotiated 
outcomes can emerge.3 
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In contrast, environmental accords which involve multiple countries tend to 
be both ineffective and poorly designed.4 Many international agreements have 
sweeping goals but offer little or no plan for how to achieve the desired results. 
The 1992 Climate Change Convention, and even the somewhat more specific 
1997 Kyoto Protocol, provide classic examples of this tendency toward grand 
aspirations (e.g., the stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases) without any clear action plan. Similarly, the Stockholm Declaration of 
1972 asserts that states have 'the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction' (Principle 21). The 
Rio Declaration of 1992 reiterates this principle (Principle 2). But lofty aims, 
such as 'no transboundary pollution,' are unworkable. If taken literally, they 
would be unreasonably expensive because they inessence mandate a'no emis- 
sions' standard. More importantly, while they appear to establish rules govern- 
ing environmental property rights - lodging the rights with the victims of 
pollution - they provide no mechanisms for adjudicating and enforcing these 
rights (Bodansky, 1995). Such agreements thus quickly descend into farce, as 
some observers have recently suggested has happened with the 1992 Climate 
Change Convention (The Economist, 20 July 1996, 68). 
Because these agreements offer little promise of effective collective gain and 
could result, if taken seriously, in large costs, many countries sign on to them 
without any real intention of complying. Indeed, a number of countries appear 
willing to negotiate environmental treaties for their symbolic value but are 
uninterested in devoting the resources required or establishing the institutions 
necessary to make the accords binding and effective. Few countries, for example, 
have actually reduced their greenhouse gas emissions even though more than 150 
nations signed the 1992 Climate Convention committing them to take action.5 
Most countries, the United States included, are simply promoting voluntary 
cutbacks and claiming credit for activities that were justified for other reasons. 
Clear collective gains 
If international environmental agreements are to be taken seriously, they must 
target the biggest risks and advance policies that offer large welfare gains. Even 
with the enormous potential benefits from liberalized trade, it has taken the 
GATT (and now the WTO) many decades to convince the world community 
to move toward freer trade. Unless there are demonstrable and sizable envi- 
ronmental, economic or other advantages to collective action, countries will 
neither relinquish scarce resources nor sovereignty to international environ- 
mental programs. There exists, therefore, a serious threshold problem in inter- 
national environmental policymaking. Given the high costs of action, both in 
coordinating across countries and in getting nations to give up national regu- 
latory authority, countries will not act until a threat looms large and the benefits 
of action are concomitantly significant. This argues for devoting the inevitably 
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limited resources available for international environmental programs to those 
issues that are most pressing.6 It also suggests that the world community should 
invest in rigorous scientific analysis of those problems that portend great harm. 
In fact, a serious response to climate change awaits a more sharply defined 
consensus on the magnitude of the threat, probability of specific harms, and 
timing of impacts. 
Efficiency as a step toward credibility 
Even where serious problems are identified, such as ozone layer depletion, 
international agreements will not be successful unless they appear likely to 
deliver substantial net benefits. Efficiency is now widely accepted as a virtue in 
domestic environmental policymaking (EPA Strategy Plan 1992). Not only 
must the biggest risks be targeted first, but standards should be pushed to the 
point (and only to the point) where the marginal benefits of action equal the 
marginal costs (Baumol and Oates, 1975). Policy mechanisms hould deliver the 
maximum returns per dollar invested. Policies must therefore be designed to 
minimize the sum of pollution prevention and control expenditures (including 
lost economic opportunities) and the costs inflicted by the residual (unabated) 
environmental damages. By choosing such least social cost approaches to 
environmental problems, international agreements can maximize the potential 
gains of cooperation and make international policy actions relative more 
attractive. In contrast, if international agreements disregard effciency and thus 
entail exceedingly expensive abatement programs or promote ineffective pro- 
grams that fail to reduce damages, there is little incentive for countries to 
surrender sovereignty or resources to the cause. Moreover, popular support for 
further environmental action will be undermined by an inchoate perception 
that we are paying too high a price for environmental progress. 
To date, international environmental policy makers have not placed suffi- 
cient emphasis on finding efficient solutions to the challenges they face. The 
1992 Climate Change Convention mandates that OECD countries reduce their 
own greenhouse gas emissions; yet, the same money invested in China and 
other developing countries would yield much greater reductions. For this rea- 
son, moving the international response to climate change toward relatively 
more efficient and lower cost policy approaches, such as emissions trading 
regimes, offers considerable promise (Wiener, 1997; Kopp, Morganstern and 
Toman, 1998; Stavins, 1997).7 Environmental policies must be - and are - 
judged not only on the magnitude of the harms they address, but also on their 
success. If only costly solutions are on the table, countries are unlikely to agree 
on serious controls, or at least not on ones that will be seriously enforced. 
Another important step toward more effective environmental action would 
be the development of mechanisms to help regulators factor all of the relevant 
costs into their policy calculus. Programs which fail to account fully for the 
welfare losses from environmental damages may minimize abatement costs but 
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will not optimally address pollution harm. A program which ignores pollution 
prevention and control costs may push emissions reduction efforts beyond the 
point where intervention makes sense, with the result that relatively unimpor- 
tant reductions end up consuming large amounts of resources. And, most 
critically in the international policy domain, a program which measures only 
the damages in the country which emits the pollution will fail to include trans- 
boundary damages and so will understate the benefits of collective action 
(Olson, 1965; Esty, 1996). 
Where pollution is global in nature, emissions from anywhere in the world 
cause an equal measure of damage because they mix evenly in the atmosphere. 
Thus, in developing an optimal response to climate change, policy makers must 
calibrate the expected value of the potential harm worldwide and compare this 
to the costs of action - moving down a global spectrum of possible greenhouse 
gas emission reductions and sink enhancement options, until the expected 
marginal global benefits equal the marginal costs. If the cheapest abatement 
opportunities for greenhouse gases are in China, as appears to be the case, then 
that is where the world should concentrate its abatement efforts first.8 Although 
the prospect of spending U.S. abatement dollars in China may seem politically 
unattractive, it offers the promise of stretching the impact of our abatement 
spending many times. If the planet does not care where emissions reductions 
occur, why should policymakers? Our global strategy should look for the least 
expensive abatement options regardless of where they occur. The issue here is 
separating where improvements should be made from who should pay for them. 
Note again that identifying true least social cost policies depends fundamen- 
tally on comprehensive consideration of all the costs and benefits of a partic- 
ular policy intervention, not simply those within the countries advancing the 
policy in question. Any one country's interest in factoring in extraterritorial 
costs and benefits derives not just from altruism but also from the promise of 
reciprocal treatment from others.9 Countries must recognize that they will be 
victims of transboundary pollution and not just polluters that benefit from 
ignoring foreign damages. The United States, for example, is the world's largest 
emitter of carbon dioxide today, but in the future it may well be a victim of 
global warming emissions from other countries. 
Valuation and value differences 
The challenge of adopting least social cost policies is made more complicated 
by the fact that, to minimize social costs, environmental policies must properly 
value abatement costs and environmental damages. Accurate pricing is difficult 
enough to do within a single country as different interest groups and individuals 
honestly disagree about the value to place on environmental resources and thus 
what weights to assign to various harms and possible policy interventions. 
Traditionally, environmentalists have pressed for very large weights to be as- 
signed to environmental and health damages and low weights be given to abate- 
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ment costs.10 Industrialists, on the other hand, have sometimes argued that 
abatement costs should be given enormous weight and environmental damages 
should largely be dismissed. 
The valuation problem is exacerbated in an international context. Richer 
countries have extensive resources and can afford to address a long list of social 
concerns. They willingly choose to devote large amounts of money to remove 
small health threats and minor environmental degradation. Although poor 
countries may share the preferences and beliefs of their wealthier neighbors, 
they face many pressing demands for their scarce resources and cannot afford 
to invest as much in environmental protection. The stringent air, water, and 
waste disposal policies of industrialized countries translate into high values on 
environmental damages. In contrast, the relatively lax policies of less developed 
countries imply relatively lower values on environmental and health rists.11 
In practice these differences in values mean that the United States can and 
should spend more money to reduce air pollution than China. Or put another 
way, the United States should have more stringent air pollution standards than 
China. Although the Chinese might prefer a much cleaner environment, given 
other pressing social needs, they choose not to have U.S. standards. In light of 
these competing resources demands, it is rational for the Chinese to place 
different values on environmental interventions than Americans. As China's 
resources expand, the Chinese will likely want to spend more on environmental 
protection, allowing their standards to rise over time. Moreover, even the 
poorest countries will find that some investments in pollution prevention and 
control yield significant net benefits.12 
This variation in values complicates international environmental policy- 
making and the achievement of cooperative solutions which all countries per- 
ceive as advantageous. In particular, if a low value is placed on a particular 
harm, richer countries that would have placed a higher value on the issue in 
question will feel that too little is being done to reduce damages. Poor countries 
will, similarly, object if high values are used which imply that they must do 
more to control emissions, no matter that they have other high priorities for 
their limited resources. Disagreements about values cannot be eliminated by 
efficient or caring environmental policies. The challenge is to find ways to bridge 
the valuation gap and to make sound environmental decisions in an atmosphere 
where this tension over values exists. 
As a step toward resolving this policy problem and determining how much 
environmental protection to seek, we suggest that when environmental costs 
are borne by more than a single country, the harms should be valued by the 
victims. Placing different weights on the same effect across different people is 
controversial. Allowing people to value the damages which accrue to them will 
generally result in high values being used for effects in wealthy countries, 
justifying higher levels of investment in pollution control than will be deemed 
optimal in poorer countries. Such differences may feel unfair. Indeed, the prin- 
ciple of universal values sounds more equitable. One might even think universal 
values would assist less-developed countries. But they do not. 
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If all people had access to the same level of resources, universal values would 
treat all countries alike and, except for some minor disagreements about taste, 
this approach would be reasonable. But, there are several problems with this 
logic. First, the 'values' we are focused on are those associated with certain 
investments in pollution control. This value can only be established in the 
context of the alternative environmental investment strategies available in each 
country. Second, incomes are not equilibrated across the world so that, in 
practice, universal values would not affect everyone equally. In fact, universal 
values imply that all parties should reduce emissions to an equal degree, regard- 
less of where the harm occurs. For some cases, such as with greenhouse gases, 
where the major polluters are currently developed countries, this may seem 
attractive to developing countries. However, a policy based on the values of 
the developed world would imply that developing countries should adopt the 
stringent (and expensive) pollution control policies of industrialized nations on 
all pollution. But this would clearly be a mistake. Developing countries would 
be much worse off if they had to devote scarce resources to abating relatively 
benign pollution sources rather than devoting these funds to other investments, 
such as educating their children or building better public health facilities, that 
would yield greater benefits. 
Using the values of the industrialized world to set pollution control standards 
in developing countries will make the people in developing countries worse off. 
With resources scarce, poor countries can ill afford to dissipate funds on prob- 
lems that only the developed world deems important. Critics who argue for a 
single global value of life as a guide to environmental standards do not serve 
the poor, but rather impoverish them.13 
The principle that costs should be valued by the people who bear them, in 
turn, has implications for least social cost pollution control policies. If pollution 
remains domestic, that is, the emissions do not cross national boundaries, 
individual countries should be free to seek the level of control must suited to 
their own values and situation. Countries that judge the damages from domes- 
tic emisisons to be modest should be allowed to adopt low environmental 
standards.'4 Countries that perceive damages from domestic emissions to be 
high should be allowed to pursue stringent regulations. Environmental rules for 
domestic pollution should be tailored across the globe to meet national objec- 
tives. 
When pollution crosses national borders, optimal policies must recognize 
costs borne by foreign countries. Domestic values should not be assumed for 
costs borne in foreign lands. As noted above, the damages should be calculated 
using the values of those who bear them. For example, if a poor country emits 
pollutants which cross into a wealthier neighboring country, the policy calculus 
should reflect the higher values of the neighbor, resulting in a more stringent 
level of optimal pollution control. Similarly, if the pollution from a wealthy 
country moves into a poor nation, the damages should be valued by the poor 
nation indicating a different optimal level of investment in pollution prevention 
and abatement.15 
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Who should pay and how much? 
Although the value of damages, and thus the level of pollution control, should 
be determined by those who bear the harm, who should pay for pollution 
prevention or abatement and how much they should pay are separate questions. 
For example, suppose there are two neighboring countries, a poor country A 
and a wealthy country B. If A emits 10 units of pollution that spill over onto 
wealthier B and B values the harm at $100 per unit, then A would have caused 
$1000 of damages. But who should pay for the abatement to reduce these 
damages, A or B? Under a 'pollute pays principle,' A owes B $1000. If B owns 
the property rights then A must compensate B. 
Fairness, at least in one sense, suggests that polluters should compensate 
victims for pollution harms. But although the polluter pays principle is invoked 
in many international environmental agreements, this principle is honored in 
the breach (Bodansky, 1995).16 In practice, victims tend to pay to eliminate most 
transboundary pollution. Indeed, in the absence of a strong norm in support of 
the polluter pays principle, property rights tend to be seized by polluters (Esty, 
1996). This 'default' rule perhaps reflects another legal norm: possession is 
nine-tenths of the law. Simply put, the property-rights-based definition of equity 
runs head on into a competing notion of fairness based on ability to pay. Poorer 
countries tend to argue that, in deciding who will foot the bill for international 
environmental programs, the ability-to-pay norm should trump the polluter 
pays principle. 
Until the who should pay question is resolved, little serious international 
environmental protection should be expected. From an environmental policy 
perspective, it makes sense to evolve toward an emphasis on the polluter pays 
principle, but pragmatism dictates that the logic of ability to pay must be taken 
seriously until there exists much more equal income distribution across the 
world. In sum, those who want action are probably going to have to pay for it. 
As countries industrialize and develop, they should be expected to shoulder a 
growing share of international burdens. Furthermore, it is reasonable to ask 
that countries pursue 'no regrets' pollution control policies17 even while their 
incomes are low. China, for example, might be prevailed upon to stop subsi- 
dizing coal purchases (efficient pricing would deter coal burning and lower 
CO2 emissions) since this would increase overall Chinese welfare and reduce 
global pollution. 
Fundamentally, concerns about equity, while important, must not be permit- 
ted to hold sound international environmental policies hostage or to make 
global abatement programs ineffective or inefficient. Environmental treaties 
that deliver poor results increase both public and governmental frustration, 
thereby increasing the risk that nothing will get done. 
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Conclusion 
International environmental programs must focus on big problems and efficient 
outcomes so that they become attractive to the governments and the publics 
that make up the world community. To achieve this goal, many of the economic 
principles that are now well-established in domestic environmental policies need 
to be more rigorously applied to international environmental policymaking. 
Specifically, environmentalists should become advocates of least-social-cost 
policies to ensure that international environmental programs show the sub- 
stantial net benefits that decisionmakers demand to see before they are willing 
to accept the financial obligations and sovereignty implications of global envi- 
ronmental programs. International environmental agreements must also respect 
differences in values, protect property rights, and recognize alternative per- 
spectives regarding who should pay for global environmental protection. 
Moving simultaneously on all of these issues may sound like a tall order. But 
the world community's ability to respond to global environmental challenges 
depends on progress on these multiple fronts. 
Notes 
1. Unifying the states and achieving collective action at the national level in the United States has 
produced some backlash in defense of state sovereignty. But, in general, the federal authority 
to act has not been questioned. Thus, while U.S. environmental policies have, in many cases, 
proven to be suboptimal, the weaknesses cannot be traced to structural failures. 
2. Uncertainties in the science of climate change further inhibit the incentive for action by render- 
ing the benefits of undertaking expansive greenhouse gas controls less concrete. 
3. Coase (1960) demonstrated that regardless of who holds the property rights, efficient actions 
can be negotiated where transaction costs are low. 
4. Even the Montreal Protocol, designed to curb releases of CFCs and other chemicals that harm 
the ozone layer and often cited as an example of international policy success (Keohane, Hass, 
and Levy, 1994), has serious limitations - and may yet prove not to be effective (Brack, 1996). 
5. The 1992 Climate Change Convention called upon OECD countries to try to reduce green- 
house gas emissions in the year 2000 to 1990 levels. Only three nations - Great Britain, 
Russia, and Germany - are on track to achieve this goal, and the latter two are largely getting 
there because of post-Cold War adjustments. Developing countries agreed only to inventory 
their emissions and to develop plans to reduce them. 
6. Esty (1994: pp. 120-21) describes criteria for significance: importance of the resource affected, 
strength of the scientific injury assessment, speed at which harm is occurring, irreversibility of 
the potential damage, and breadth of the threatened harm. 
7. The relationship between citizens and state regulatory traditions, and experience with market 
mechanisms varies widely across the nations of the world. Thus, the level of comfort with 
economic instruments as the centerpiece of global environmental policies also varies consid- 
erably. The sharp divide between the United States and Europe over the advisability of relying 
on emissions trading in the climate change contest is emblematic of these differences. 
8. The cheapest abatement opportunities will generally lie in developing countries because they 
have had more lax domestic regulations and therefore have not forced polluters to spend much 
on controls. Developing countries may also have the least expensive opportunities to abate 
because their economies tend to be less efficient, using more inputs per unit of output. 
234 
9. Such reciprocity is the key to establishing 'collective action' and overcoming a 'prisoners' 
dilemma' dynamic that otherwise leads to suboptimal outcomes. 
10. Some environmentalists have even gone so far as to value environmental benefits by measuring 
costs - i.e., suggesting that the resources devoted to abatement represent a measure of the 
environmental improvement to be expected. This is a mistake because it encourages expensive 
programs which may provide no environmental improvements at all and it fails to ensure that 
real environmental gains will be obtained. 
11. We are not saying that poorer countries do not want highter standards but simply that they 
cannot afford them given their competing resource needs. Thus, the 'value' implied here is an 
economic value derived from opportunity cost - not an abstract or moral valuation. 
12. Thus, the suggestion, often made by officials in developing countries, that their nations cannot 
afford pollution controls is unequivocally wrong. They cannot and should not adopt advanced 
environmental standards across-the-board, but they cannot afford not to put in place basic 
prevention and abatement programs. In fact, the poorest countries can least afford mistakes in 
regulatory decisions and would benefit the most from making high-return initial investments 
in environmental protection - such as siting pollution factories downwind from population 
centers. 
13. One could reply that, as a matter of global morality, the rich should subsidize the poor. But 
there is no consensus on such distributional equity. In fact, the recent fall in foreign aid or 
overseas development assistance (ODA) worldwide implies movement away from any such 
equity principle. Moreover, our goal is to identify optimal environmental strategies within the 
constraints of the current policy context, including income inequalities and a limited willing- 
ness to address distributional issues. 
14. We assume that governments are representative and that they accurately and fairly represent 
the needs and wishes of their people. This assumption fails in many real world circumstances. 
In fact, serious public choice failures - from outright corruption to special interest campaign 
contributions and lobbying - plague environmental policymaking the world over (Dua and 
Esty, 1997). One must be careful, however, in challenging domestic decisions of other countries 
while simultaneously claiming sovereignty over one's own choices. 
15. Note that we separate the question of how much of an investment should be made in pollution 
control from that of how much compensation the victim country should receive. We consider 
who should pay and how much in the next section of the paper. 
16. One advantage when the victims pay for abatement is that there are no moral hazard problems. 
The victims have an incentive to reveal their true values and to pay only for the amount of 
abatement they really want. 
17. No regrets policies are those that have a logic above and beyond the environmental benefits 
they offer. Investments in energy efficiency, for instance, can often be justified because of cost 
savings regardless of the pollution benefits implied by lower levels of energy consumption. 
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